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Clean Up Your Act 
After 10 years ofrulings restricting citizen-suit enforcement of environmental laws, 
the U.S. Supreme Court may be set to force plaintiff groups to pick their cases wisely. 
BY ALAN M. RAMO 
The original idea behind the citizen-suit concept, 
found in the federal Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, 
Community Right to Know Act and others, was to sup-
plement environmental law enforcement and to save 
taxpayer money while holding polluters and govern-
ment regulators accountable. 
Defendants frequently claim that citizen suits are 
disruptive to orderly 
enforcement be-




agencies. See, e.g., 
Citizens for a Better 
ElIvironment-Cali-
fornia v. Union Oil 
Co. of California, 83 
F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 
1996). Polluters say 
that enforcement ef-
forts are nothing 
more than extortion 
or payoffs to plain-
tiffs seeking fees 
and contributions 
for their allied envi~ 
ronmental groups. 
The 9th U.S. Cir-
cuit Court of Ap-
peals has ruled, 
however, that such 
settlements are 
proper if they 
achieve the govern-
ing act's purposes 
by protecting the 
ecosystem the de-
fendant allegedly 
harmed. Sierra Club 
Inc. v. Electronic 
Controls Design !tIC., 
909 F .2d 1350 (9th 
Cir.1990). 
In spite of con-
gressional approval 
of citizen suits and a 
lengthy record of 
achievements mea-
sured by penalties 
and pollution abate-
ment, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has 
led the charge to 
curtail citizen-suit fil-
ings. Initially, the 
Supreme Court 
turned what had 
been a pre-litigation 
notice - the 50-
called 6O-day notice 
of intent to sue -
into a formal 
"mandatory condi-
tion precedent for 
suit" 
In Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20 (1989), 
the court dismissed a case years after a judgment find-
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ing the defendant had violated the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act because of the failure to send 
the notice to state and federal environmental authori-
ties in addition to the defendant, as mandated by the 
act's 6O-day notice provisions. 
The Hallstrom ruling reverberated in lower courts. 
In Washington Trout v. McCain Foods Inc., 45F.3d 
1351 (9th Cir. 1994). the 9th Circuit held that even 
though a notice was timely filed, its failure to include 
two additional plaintiffs rendered it fatally defective and 
deprived plaintiffs of jurisdiction. The 9th Circuit later 
ruled in another case that a 6O-day notice sent to the 
proper persons in a timely manner with the proper 
plaintiffs was still insufficient, because it was not de-
tailed enough to alert the parties to the substance of 
the lawsuit Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
California found flawed a notice that did not precisely 
state the date of the violations. California Sportjishing 
Protection Alliance 
v. City of Sacramen-
to, 905 F.Supp. 792 
(E.D. Cal. 1995). 
In each case, the 
plaintiffs would pre-
sumably have to file 
a new 60-day no-
tice, followed by a 
new complaint For-
malism had its lim-
its, however. A 
court rejected as 
frivolous the argu-
ment that failing to 
include "Inc." after 
a nonprofit corpora-
tion's name was in-
adequate notice to 
the party. Natural 
Resources Defense 
Council v. South-
west Marine Inc .. 
945 F.Supp 1330, 
1334 (S.D. Cal. 
1996). 
About the same 
time as Hallstrom, 
the U.S. Supreme 
Court began to de-
velop a more far-
reaching constitu-
tional limitation on 
citizen suits -
standing. In Lujan 
v. National Wildlife 
Federation, 497 U.S. 
871 (1990), the 
plaintiffs argued 




when making a 
broad programmat-
ic decision to re-
classify various 
lands so that they 
could be subject to 
mining. 
In a 54 decision, 
the court held that 
the plaintiffs' failure 
to visit one piece of 
land among those 
reclassified meant 
they did not have 
standing to sue 
over the entire re-
classification, as their standing was limited only to deci-
sions about individual parcels where they had some 
ongoing physical contact 
Two years later, in Lujan v. Ddenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555 (1992), the court further chipped away at the 
notion of injury. While a plaintiff's member had visited 
a site to see an endangered species - the Nile croco-
Illustration by Pl'lul Lschir 
dile at the Aswan Dam site in Egypt - the plaintiff 
could not prove the member would continue to visit 
the site. Thus, it would not be injured by the building , 
of the dam destroying the crocodile's habitat A con-
curring opinion stated that the decision might have 
been different- if plaintiffs members had plane tickets 
to visit the site again. 
These cases presented barriers, but ones that a care-
ful plaintiff anticipating the rules of standing and notice 
might still overcome. But they were only a prelude to 
the U.S. Supreme Court's most direct attack on citizen 
suits.' 
In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 
S.Ct. 1003 (1998), Justice Antonin Scalia led the court 
in asserting a narrow interpretation of injury as a basis 
for stindini. In Steel Co., the plaintiffs had served' a 6(). 
day notice on a company that had failed to file its Com-
munity Right to Know Act reports of toxic chemicals 
used or discharged for a number of years. The compa-
ny filed the reports after receiving the 6().day notice but 
before the lawsuit 
The court opined that there was no standing, reason-
ing that neither penalties, attorney fees nor even a 
claim for injunctive relief is sufficient. If a company 
comes into compliance, and there are no allegations in-
dicating a continuing or imminent violation, then the 
company can presumably escape penalties, avoid an in-
junction and not pay the plaintiffs for their trouble in 
getting the violation remedied. . 
Many. environmentalists believe Steel Co. has elimi-
nated effective citizen enforcement of the Community 
Right to Know Act. Why would an environmental 
group go to the expense of investigating violations and' 
issue a 6().day noti~ if a violator can escape paying a ' 
penalty or fees by complying prior to the lawsuit? 
At least one commentator argued that Steel Co. may 
·. <'.'., 
... . '. 
be a blessing in disguise, forcing environmentalists to nently, removing equipment and ceasing all industrial 
pick better cases, ones which are serious and directly activity , 
affect their members. Ann E.Carlson, "Standing for The 4th Circuit later answered the unanswered 
the Environment," 45 UCIAL. Rev. 931 (April 1998). question in Laidlaw: If there is no proven harm from 
Two of the five justices in the Steel Co. majority em- '. the increased pollution to begin With, there is not even 
phasized in a concurring opinion that standing would standing, even if a permit is violated. Friendso/the 
be appropriate if there were allegations of a continuing Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d 107 
violation or an imminent threat at the time of filing suit (4thCir. 1999); see also Contra Ecological Rights 
That emphasis, resulting in injunctive relief, has a1- Found. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 1999 U.S. Dist Lexis 
lowed at least two citizen suit cases in California to sur- 13518 (N.D. Cal. 1999) at 41. 
vive motions to dismiss requestsJor penalties and fees. A case better designed for making bad case law for 
San Francisco Baykeeper v. Vallejo Sanitation & Flood citizen-suit,plaintiffs can hardly be imagined. Yet the 
Control Dist., 36 F.Supp.2d 1214 (E.D. Cal. 1999); Nat- U.s. Supreme Court accepted the Laidlaw plaintiffs' ap-
ural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine peal. Oral arguments are scheduled this month. Some 
Inc., 28 F.Supp.2d 584 (s. D. Cal. 1998). environmentalists believe' that the court's· review of 
However, many environmentalists fear Steel Co. is Laidlaw bodes well for the environmentalists. Others 
not the end of citizen-suit restrictions and they may be argue that a majority looking to further restrain citizen 
right In Friends o/the Earth v. Laidlaw, 149 F.3d. 303 suits could not resist taking the case to further expand 
(4th Cir. 1998), cert granted, 143 L.Ed.2d 107 (1999), upon its decades-long attack. 
an environmental group sued a company for violating A sweeping U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding 
the Clean Water Ad . Laidlaw would be a blow to citizen suits, but not neces-
The court ruled the polluter did emit pollutants ex- sarilyan end to citizen. enforcement. The·fact that a 
ceeding its permit and would be fined. However, the number of these cases are successful demonstrates 
court also ruled that since the company's permit viola- that administrative agencies cannot do the job. The en-
tions had not harmed the environment, and there were . vironmental movement is too far along to simply. stand 
no permit violations for a number of years by the time by when permits are violated. Environmentalists are in-
the case went to trial, injunctive relief was not appropri- creasingly looking at state remedies, such as California 
ate. Business and Professions Code SeCtion 17200 (unfair 
On appeal, the 4th Circuit reversed the judgment for trade practices). See' Citizens for a Better EnvironmeJlt 
penalties and fees. The court noted since the plaintiffs v. Union Oil, 996 F.Supp. 934, 936 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
had not appealed the injunction denial; the only .reme- Efforts may be made to bring federal causes of ac-
dies at issue were penalties and fees. tion in state court, where standing requirements are 
Relying on Steel Co., the court found neither of these less stringent Increasingly, tort law is seen as an aid to 
a redressable injury, mooting the case. It further ruled remedy environmental hazards. Permit holders may 
that if a case is moot, then the plaintiffs had not pre- fondly look back on the time when environmentalists 
vailed and were not entitled to fees. Since theil, the de- . sued for statu~ry.yeni:JJp~,@Jl~injun~v~ relief}nstead 
fendant has shut down the facility, apparently penna- . of large tort penaltiesfc?rpo~utionIeftunabated; 
... : .. ; •. ;.. . ....... /~> .. 
